Bush's Political Stock

Remember how when Roberts was nominated over the summer, many Democrats (not the elected officials, the ordinary people who just happen to vote for that party) point out that they had little reason to object to the Roberts nomination because Bush had won the Presidency and he was now just nominating a conservative like he had promised.

That was before Hurrican Katrina, Fitzmas, and the debacle that was Harriet Miers. I think that by far the best indicator of Bush's severly diminished political stock is that no one is saying that now. Alito seems to be in the same mold as Roberts but the media is making a far bigger deal about it this time around. Now you can attribute that to media bias but this time around, it just seems like critics of Alito are going to have more traction then they ever did against Roberts (not that this traction will amount to anything).

It will be interesting to see how Bush responds to this. He has never really had to overcome any type of strife in his administration. David Brooks had an excellent article last week about how Reagan responded to the Iran-Contra scandal by cleaning house and reinvigorating the White House.

On Dec. 31, 1986, Robert Novak and Rowland Evans wrote a column with the headline "The Reagan Presidency Is Dead." Halfway into its second term, the Reagan administration was beset by the Iran-contra scandal. Its legislative agenda was in tatters. Morale was low, and the decision-making process was in chaos.

Ronald Reagan had to decide whether to hunker down in the storm or break out of it. Pat Buchanan, who was the communications director, recommended that the president bring a special counselor into the White House to handle Iran-contra and bring an objective perspective to the administration's troubles.

Reagan agreed. David Abshire, then the ambassador to NATO, was hired and given complete autonomy.

Abshire describes his job in his new book, "Saving the Reagan Presidency." He had four tasks. First, puncture the bubble of intellectual conformity that marks every administration by breaking the spell of groupthink and self-serving spin. Abshire had direct access to the president, and in his 12 one-on-one meetings with Reagan, he was able to say things he could never have said in larger meetings. Even so, Reagan found it very hard to admit that what happened in Iran-Contra actually happened.

Second, iron out the feuds and tensions (between, say, Defense and State). Third, repair relations with Capitol Hill. Congress dominates all second terms, and any president who doesn't adapt will fail.

Finally, Abshire helped kick-start a new policy agenda. The old chief of staff, Don Regan, was fired, and Howard Baker was brought in. Reagan gave a contrite speech taking responsibility for Iran-contra, and his approval rating jumped nine points.

New initiatives to end the cold war were launched, including the speech calling on Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall. Domestic ideas, built around an economic bill of rights, were floated. The administration never fully recovered, but the last two years of Reagan's term were productive, and, in the way Reagan dealt with Gorbachev, historic.

The Bush administration is not in quite the same bind the Reagan administration was in. There is no one big scandal (sorry, Plamegate is not it). But at key moments - Social Security, Katrina, Harriet Miers - the president has been uncharacteristically out of step with the American people. Second-term-itis is setting in.

Brooks' obvious conclusion is that Bush should do as Reagan did. I don't see that happening from the president who would have stuck with Miers out of dedication to her as a friend, but it may end up being the only option. We'll see what happens.

-Mr. Alec