Noah Feldman on Iraq's Constitution.

The status of the Iraqi constitution is one that I have left alone for quite some time. This was mostly due to lack of interesting coverage (outside of the front-page material) and a general lack of understanding (that I believe was shared by most) about what was really going on.

Well finally I (and hopefully you the reader) have some help. First, the draft constitution has been translated into English on the BBC website. I did not read it all, but the first half was rather interesting. Second, Noah Feldman, one of my favorite academics wrote an op-ed in the New York Times today on Iraq's constitution, something he has a unique knowledge of. In 2003 Feldman, who is fluent in Arabic and a constitutional law professor, went to Iraq as the Senior Advisor on constitutional law to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Feldman shares some intriguing and often humorous anecdotes of his work for the CPA in his book What We Owe Iraq, which is sort of a half-travelogue half-ethical analysis of nation building.

Regardless of his qualifications Feldman had some interesting observations today about a constitutional process that has left many befuddled. He is able to provide a rather blunt opinion while simultaneously providing much of the uncovered back story to the constitutional negotiations.

This is definitely something you should read all of, but I'll provide you with the juiciest taste:

It had taken two years for most Shiite Iraqis to begin to embrace the idea of federalism, and it was never realistic to expect Sunnis to undergo the same process of resigned acceptance in a matter of weeks.

Yet just as the train of Sunni rejectionism was gathering momentum, American insistence on meeting an arbitrary deadline was hurtling in the other direction. President Bush's personal intervention - he called Mr. Hakim late last week to ask for Shiite concessions and more talk - was a case of too little too late, and in any event conflicted with the message of time pressure that the Americans had been pushing for months. And when the Shiites and Kurds chose to send the constitution to the public without reaching an agreement with their Sunni partners, the latter had little choice but to publicly condemn the process and the draft.

In the end, placing Sunnis on the constitution committee despite the electoral results in January, then pressuring them to do a deal, was an approach that backfired: ignoring them when their views could not be reconciled sent a strong message to average Sunnis that politics is useless if you are in the minority.

Although things look bad today, the game is not yet quite over. Should the constitution be rejected on Oct. 15, everyone can head back to the negotiation table and try again. In fact, the worst outcome might be a passage of the draft despite widespread rejection by Sunni voters. While it is apparently too late to change the text, Shiites and Kurds can still reach out to Sunni voters and try to convince them that they would flourish under the constitution. This would require a few public concessions, including commitments not to form a southern mega-region that leaves the impoverished Sunnis trapped between de facto Shiite and Kurdish states.

A constitution is just a piece of paper, no better than the underlying consensus - or lack thereof - that it memorializes. If Iraq adopts a constitution that reflects a profound and unresolved national split, violence and eventual division of the nation will follow. Ordinary Iraqis and American soldiers will be the losers. So will the ideal of constitutional government.

The most interesting point Feldman makes is about the possible rejection of the draft constitution. He is probably correct, nothing would more properly engage Iraqi's about the state of their nation than a narrow rejection of the charter. Also this would prove to the Sunni's that they have some recourse other than violence. This of course is probably a pipe-dream. First, the United States would never allow it to happen (how bizarre is it that the Iraqi vote on their constitution may end up being more important than Bush's midterm elections). Second, it would be an uphill battle for Sunni's to gain support, especially if many decide, like last the time, to not even vote.

But hopefully this ratification process can encourage the Sunni's to motivate their voting base and show the Shiites and Kurds, politically, that compromises are required to hold this country together.

-Mr. Alec

PS Also check out Noah Feldman's book on Islamic democracy, After Jihad